三星降價搶單

呂紹玉，台積電 16 奈米敵不過三星價格戰，6 大客戶就有 4 家轉單，TechNews，2015 年 04 月 09 日

這些日子以來，台積電大客戶轉單的消息甚囂塵上，而據科技新報獨家取得的消息，證實高通採 20 奈米製程以下的新產品確定轉單至三星，NVIDIA 行動處理器 K1 也確定轉單三星，AMD GPU 也會轉單，加上蘋果下一代 A9 處理器訂單也將以三星為主，這麼一來，台積電前 6 大客戶就有 4 家將部分採先進製程的訂單轉單，對台積電相當不利，影響恐在年底到明年初開始發酵。 

台積電的大客戶出走，據悉是跟台積電先進製程報價強硬，而三星 14 奈米製程又降價搶單有關。 

三星在 28 奈米製程之後，直接轉進 14 奈米製程，並率先於今年第一季開始量產，新上市的旗艦機 Galaxy S6、S6 Edge 所搭載的 Exynos 7420 行動處理器即採用 14 奈米製程生產，打響三星 14 奈米製程名聲。 

因為直轉 14 奈米製程，三星投入相當高的建廠成本，也因為早先傳出蘋果 A9 處理器訂單會全數交由三星，三星甚至為此擴產。不過現在傳 A9 訂單只有 2/3 交給三星，讓三星面臨產能閒置的危機，而在廠房設備折舊成本高的晶圓代工產業，據傳三星為了搶單填補產能，讓客戶以相當彈性的價格議價，最終導致台積電大客戶轉單。... 

據富邦投顧資料，就 2014 全年營收來看，台積電主要客戶分別是高通 (佔總營收 15%)，再來是博通 (8%)、NVIDIA (7%)、聯發科 (7%)、AMD/ATI (6%)、蘋果(6%)。光是這 6 家客戶就佔台積電總營收 49%，現在有 4 家將在先進製程部分轉單，預計會造成台積電 16 奈米產能閒置，成長動能受限，其效應在今年底到明年開始發酵。

偉創力 (Flextronics) 的供應鏈軟體

RACHAEL KING, Flextronics Will Manage Global Supply Chain With New Real-Time Software, Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2015 

Flextronics International Ltd., said Tuesday it has created software that will help the company manage its complex global network of 14,000 suppliers in real time. 

Flextronics, which designs, manufactures and ships products for other businesses, expects the software to help identify potential problems with suppliers earlier and redirect work to keep inventory moving. 

台廠接蘋果的訂單

謝艾莉報導，和碩擴廠 瞄準蘋果新單，經濟日報，2015-07-09 

和碩昨（8）日公告，子公司世碩電子於中國大陸昆山取得廠房工程，投資新台幣5 億元。和碩去年規劃在蘇州、昆山擴產，其中世碩昆山新廠總投資額逾 10 億元，預計明年下半年投產，搶攻蘋果新訂單意味濃厚。 

和碩在大陸的工廠包括上海、蘇州、重慶、昆山；上海廠已經滿載，沒有腹地擴產，因此未來擴產重心放在蘇州與昆山；重慶則暫時不會有動作。 

和碩財務長林秋炭表示，世碩昆山新廠明年下半年投產，以因應明年旺季，完工後將負責組裝手機、NB 等產品，規劃的產能相當彈性，只要有訂單都可以做。

美思科技的智慧照護床墊

王怡棻，MIT 校友攜手華碩大將 美思科技 小留學生用大數據插旗醫療業，遠見雜誌，第343期，2015 年 1 月號

一走進美思科技 (MedicusTek) 位於南港軟體園區的實驗室，繞過寫滿方程式的白板屏風，一張醫院用的標準病床立刻映入眼簾。床上平放著一張薄薄軟墊。看似平凡無奇，實則暗藏玄機。 

「這個墊子其實是一塊大感測器，從上到下布滿感測元件，」38 歲的美思科技總經理許家銘指著產品「智慧照護床墊」笑著說。當病人躺上床墊，身體所有移動都會被記錄，轉成數位資訊，透過 Wi-Fi 傳輸到雲端系統。 

經過大數據運算分析後，病人狀況與適當的照顧建議 (如協助翻身、小心跌倒等)，會即時傳進護理人員推車上的平板或智慧手錶，在第一時間了解病人需求。「護士巡房頂多一兩分鐘，但智慧照護床墊可以 24 小時持續記錄，」美思科技首席科學家馬克．安德森 (Mark Anderson) 笑說，即使出院回家，院方也可依據床墊傳輸的資訊進行遠距監測，達到無縫照護。

美國總統歐巴馬 (Obama) 如何推動數位化政府

Jon Gertner, Inside Obama's Stealth Startup, Fast Company, 2015/6/15.

原因？失敗的計劃和改造政府

Above all, there is the inertia of the past. One of the first lessons Dickerson learned about D.C. when he arrived was that the city traditionally conflates the importance of a task with its cost. Healthcare.gov ultimately became an $800 million project, with 55 contracting companies involved. "And of course it didn’t work," he says. "They set aside hundreds of millions of dollars to build a website because it was a big, important website. But compare that to Twitter, which took three rounds of funding before it got to about the same number of users as -Healthcare.gov—8 million to 10 million users. In those three rounds of funding, the whole thing added up to about $60 million." Dickerson believes that the Healthcare.gov project could have been done with a similar size budget. But there wasn’t anyone to insist that the now-well-established Silicon Valley practice of building "agile" -software—rolling out a digital product in stages; testing it; improving it; and repeating the process for continuous -improvement—would be vastly superior to (and much, much cheaper than) a patchwork of contractors building out a complete and monolithic website. In his Fast Company interview, President Obama remarks that he made a significant mistake in thinking that government could use traditional methods to build something—Healthcare.gov—that had never been built before. "When you’re dealing with IT and software and program design," the president explains, "it’s a creative process that can’t be treated the same way as a bulk purchase of pencils."...

It helps that the two men have substantial "air cover," as President Obama describes it in an exclusive, in-person interview with Fast Company. For the past year, the president explains, he has personally helped Park and his team hire talent and implement their ideas across a host of government agencies. While the reasons behind this initiative and its scope have not been made clear before, in the president’s view, the idea of building a "pipeline" of tech talent in Washington starts with practical appeal: Better digital tools could upgrade the websites of, say, the Veterans Administration, so users get crucial services that save time, money, and (for veterans in need of medical help) lives. "But what we realized was, this could be a recipe for something larger," the president explains. "You will have a more user-friendly government, a more responsive government. A government that can work with individuals on individual problems in a more tailored way, because the technology facilitates that the same way it increasingly does for private-sector companies." In other words, if Obama’s tech team can successfully rebuild the digital infrastructure of Washington—an outcome that is by no means certain yet—you might not only change its functionality. You might transform Americans’ attitudes about government too. And you might even boost their waning feelings of empowerment in an ideologically riven country of 320 million people.